OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY

NOVEMBER 21, 2013

BASICS OF RAMSEY ANALYSIS

Maintained assumptions

- Lack of lump-sum taxes (the starting point of Ramsey 1927!)
- **Completeness** of set of proportional tax instruments
- **Completeness of government debt markets**
 - Fully state-contingent set of government bonds issued in t, only one yields return depending on realized state in t+1

Completeness of tax instruments?

- **Suppose three distinct goods**, each with proportional tax rate
- Household optimality conditions

$$\frac{u_1(c_1,c_2,c_3)}{u_2(c_1,c_2,c_3)} = \frac{(1-\tau_1)\cdot p_1}{(1-\tau_2)\cdot p_2} \qquad \frac{u_2(c_1,c_2,c_3)}{u_3(c_1,c_2,c_3)} = \frac{(1-\tau_2)\cdot p_2}{(1-\tau_3)\cdot p_3}$$

Completeness of tax instruments exists if, given a Ramsey allocation

- **\Box** There is \geq one tax rate on each MRS = price ratio condition and...
- Image: ...there is a unique mapping from the Ramsey allocation to a set of tax rates

Ramsey problem

$$\max_{\{c_t, n_t, k_{t+1}\}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[u(c_t) - h(n_t) \right] \text{ s.t.}$$

$$C_t + g_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = z_t f\left(k_t, n_t\right) \qquad \begin{array}{l} \text{Sequence of Lagrange} \\ \text{multipliers } \beta^t \lambda_t \end{array}$$
Present-value
implementability
constraint (PVIC)
$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[u'(c_t) \cdot c_t - h'(n_t) \cdot n_t \right] = A_0 \qquad \begin{array}{l} \text{Single Lagrange} \\ \text{multiplier } \mu \end{array}$$

Ramsey FOCs (for t > 0, which sidesteps thorny issue of taxation of initial capital stock and other assets, of which A_0 is a function)

$$u'(c_{t}^{RP}) - \lambda_{t}^{RP} + \mu \cdot W_{c}(c_{t}^{RP}, n_{t}^{RP}) = 0$$

-h'(n_{t}^{RP}) + \lambda_{t}^{RP} z_{t} f_{n}(k_{t}^{RP}, n_{t}^{RP}) + \mu \cdot W_{n}(c_{t}^{RP}, n_{t}^{RP}) = 0
- $\lambda_{t}^{RP} + \beta E_{t} \left\{ \lambda_{t+1}^{RP} \left[z_{t+1} f_{k}(k_{t+1}^{RP}, n_{t+1}^{RP}) + 1 - \delta \right] \right\} = 0$

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Social Planner FOCs

$$u'(c_{t}^{SP}) - \lambda_{t}^{SP} = 0$$

-h'(n_{t}^{SP}) + $\lambda_{t}^{SP} z_{t} f_{n} \left(k_{t}^{SP}, n_{t}^{SP} \right) = 0$
- $\lambda_{t}^{SP} + \beta E_{t} \left\{ \lambda_{t+1}^{SP} \left[z_{t+1} f_{k} (k_{t+1}^{SP}, n_{t+1}^{SP}) + 1 - \delta \right] \right\} = 0$

Evaluate at deterministic steady states

Ramsey FOCs (for t > 0) at deterministic steady state

$$u'(c^{RP}) - \lambda^{RP} + \mu \cdot W_c(c^{RP}, n^{RP}) = 0$$

-h'(n^{RP}) + $\lambda^{RP} z \cdot f_n(k^{RP}, n^{RP}) + \mu \cdot W_n(c^{RP}, n^{RP}) = 0$
- $\lambda^{RP} + \beta \lambda^{RP} \left[z \cdot f_k(k^{RP}, n^{RP}) + 1 - \delta \right] = 0$

Social Planner FOCs at deterministic steady state

$$u'(c^{SP}) - \lambda^{SP} = 0$$

-h'(n^{SP}) + $\lambda^{SP} z \cdot f_n(k^{SP}, n^{SP}) = 0$
- $\lambda^{SP} + \beta \cdot \lambda^{SP} [z \cdot f_k(k^{SP}, n^{SP}) + 1 - \delta] = 0$

Ramsey FOCs (for t > 0) at deterministic steady state

$$u'(c^{RP}) - \lambda^{RP} + \mu \cdot W_c(c^{RP}, n^{RP}) = 0$$
⁽¹⁾

$$-h'(n^{RP}) + \lambda^{RP} z \cdot f_n(k^{RP}, n^{RP}) + \mu \cdot W_n(c^{RP}, n^{RP}) = 0$$
⁽²⁾

$$-\lambda^{RP} + \beta \lambda^{RP} \left[z \cdot f_k(k^{RP}, n^{RP}) + 1 - \delta \right] = 0$$
⁽³⁾

Social Planner FOCs at deterministic steady state

$$u'(c^{SP}) - \lambda^{SP} = 0 \tag{4}$$

$$-h'(n^{SP}) + \lambda^{SP} z \cdot f_n(k^{SP}, n^{SP}) = 0$$
⁽⁵⁾

$$-\lambda^{SP} + \beta \cdot \lambda^{SP} \left[z \cdot f_k(k^{SP}, n^{SP}) + 1 - \delta \right] = 0$$
⁽⁶⁾

- (3) and (6) imply Ramsey-optimal k/n ratio = efficient k/n ratio
 - □ (Given maintained assumption of CRS production *f*(.))
 - A crucial result!
 - Second-best k/n ratio = first-best k/n ratio
 - □ Chamley (1986 ECTA), Judd (1985 JPub) seminal references

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ZERO CAPITAL INCOME TAX

- What does this imply for Ramsey-optimal tax rates?
- Recall household optimization
 - □ With labor income tax and capital income tax (and no lump-sum taxes)

$$\max_{\{c_t, n_t, k_{t+1}\}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \Big[u(c_t) - h(n_t) \Big] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad c_t + k_{t+1} = (1 - \tau_t^n) w_t n_t + \Big[1 + (1 - \tau_t^k) (r_t - \delta) \Big] k_t$$

□ Steady-state consumption-labor optimality (labor supply condition)

$$\frac{h'(n)}{u'(c)} = (1 - \tau^n) z \cdot f_n(k, n) = w \text{ in equilibrium}$$

Steady-state consumption-savings optimality (capital Euler condition)

$$u'(c) = \beta u'(c) \left(1 + (1 - \tau^k)(z \cdot f_k(k, n) - \delta) \right)$$

- □ Ramsey-optimal capital income tax rate = 0!
- Don't tax intertemporal margin at all in the long run...
- …even though Ramsey government has to raise revenue through distortionary taxes

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POSITIVE LABOR INCOME TAX

- □ What does this imply for Ramsey-optimal tax rates?
 - □ Steady-state consumption-labor optimality (labor supply condition)

$$\frac{h'(n)}{u'(c)} = (1 - \tau^n) z \cdot f_n(k, n)$$

Steady-state consumption-savings optimality (capital Euler condition)

$$u'(c) = \beta u'(c) \left(1 + (1 - \tau^k)(z \cdot f_k(k, n) - \delta) \right)$$

- **Ramsey-optimal capital income tax rate = 0!**
- Don't tax intertemporal margin at all in the long run...
- …even though Ramsey government has to raise revenue through distortionary taxes
- → □ All revenue must be raised through positive labor income tax
 - Two central Ramsey macro fiscal policy results

DYNAMICS OF TAX RATES

- Outside the steady state?
- □ Focus on labor income tax rate (simple to consider)
 - **Consumption-labor optimality (labor supply condition)**



- Labor income tax is a wedge between labor supply and labor demand
- Along the business cycle? Consider utility form $u(c_t) - h(n_t) = \ln c_t - \frac{\kappa}{1+1/\iota} n_t^{1+1/\iota}$ is labor supply elasticity with respect to real wage

DYNAMICS OF TAX RATES

- □ Along the business cycle?
 - Consider utility form $u(c_t) h(n_t) = \ln c_t \frac{\kappa}{1 + 1/\iota} n_t^{1 + 1/\iota}$ is labor supply elasticity with respect to real wage
- Compute first and second derivatives of u(.) and h(.)......which are needed to compute $W_c(.)$ and $W_n(.)$
- Do some algebra combining the Ramsey FOCs ...

$$\kappa \cdot n_t^{1/t} \cdot c_t = \left[1 + \mu \left(\frac{1+t}{t}\right)\right]^{-1} \cdot z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)$$

= MRS_t = wedge between
MRS_t and MPN_t = MPN_t

- Wedge is a (endogenous...) constant between MRS and MPN in every time period
 - $\square \quad \mu = 0 \text{ (the case of lump-sum taxes)} \Rightarrow \text{ wedge} = 0$
 - $\square \quad \mu > 0 \text{ (the Ramsey case)} \Rightarrow wedge \neq 0$

DYNAMICS OF TAX RATES

- □ Along the business cycle?
- Wedge is a (endogenous...) constant between MRS and MPN in every time period...

$$\kappa \cdot n_t^{1/t} \cdot c_t = \left[1 + \mu \left(\frac{1+t}{t}\right)\right]^{-1} \cdot z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)$$

= MRS_t = wedge between = MPN_t

- ...thus labor income tax rate is constant over time (for this utility form)
 - □ Nearly constant if move to slightly different h(n) function
 - **Labor income tax smoothing**
 - □ Key Ramsey macro fiscal policy result
 - □ Keep deadweight losses constant across markets over time

TAX SMOOTHING



- Ramsey wants to keep these wedges constant
- **Result and intuition depend on neoclassical view of labor markets**
 - □ Labor tax is the only wedge \rightarrow tax-smoothing is wedge-smoothing