

Economics 8723  
**Macroeconomic Theory**  
**Problem Set 3**  
 Professor Sanjay Chugh  
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- 1. Taylor Staggered Nominal Price-Setting Model.** There are two groups of monopolistically-competitive firms. One group of firms sets its profit-maximizing nominal price in odd-dated periods (i.e., period 1, period 3, period 5, and so on), while the other group of firms sets its profit-maximizing nominal price in even-dated periods (i.e., period 2, period 4, period 6, and so on). Half of the firms that maximize their nominal prices in odd-dated periods, and the other half of firms maximize their nominal prices in even-dated periods.

Regardless of group, every monopolistically-competitive firm sets its optimal nominal price for two periods – that is, the profit-maximizing nominal price determined by monopolist  $i$  in period  $t$  (which is labeled  $P_{it}^*$ ) **is the nominal price for one unit of monopolist  $i$ 's output in period  $t$  AND the nominal price for one unit of monopolist  $i$ 's output in period  $t+1$** , even if market conditions have changed between periods  $t$  and  $t+1$ .

The period- $t$  final goods production function is

$$y_t = \left[ \frac{1}{2} \left( y_t^{ADJ} \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} + \frac{1}{2} \left( y_t^{NONADJ} \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}},$$

in which the superscript “*ADJ*” denotes the group of monopolists adjusting nominal prices in period  $t$  and the superscript “*NONADJ*” denotes the group of monopolists not adjusting nominal prices in period  $t$ . Regardless of group, monopolist  $i$  faces the downward-sloping demand function in period  $t$

$$y_{it} = \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} \cdot y_t,$$

has zero fixed costs of operation, and operates a constant-returns-to scale production technology, hence its total costs of production in a given time period  $t$  are  $mc_t \cdot y_{it}$ . The price index in period  $t$  is denoted  $P_t$ .

In the time period in which monopolist  $i$  is setting its profit-maximizing nominal price, its profit function is

$$\max_{P_{it}} \left\{ (P_{it} - P_t mc_t) y_{it} + E_t \Xi_{t+1|t} \left[ (P_{it} - P_{t+1} mc_{t+1}) y_{it+1} \right] \right\}.$$

- a. In period  $t$ , half of the monopolistically-competitive firms are permitted to (re-)set their optimal nominal prices. For monopolistically-competitive firm  $i$  in the group of price adjusters in period  $t$ , compute its profit-maximizing nominal price  $P_{it}$ .

**The final solution should be expressed in the form**

$$\frac{P_{it}}{P_t} = \dots$$

in which the term in ellipsis (“...”) on the right-hand side is must be determined.

**Clearly display the final solution by drawing a box around it**, and clearly and carefully provide important algebraic steps/logic that lead to the solution. (No need to display each and every step of the algebra – it is left up to you to decide which algebraic steps are the most important ones to display.)

- b. For any particular time period  $t$ , construct the **aggregate price index**  $P_t$ . **Clearly display the final solution by drawing a box around it**, and clearly and carefully provide important algebraic steps/logic that lead to the solution. (No need to display each and every step of the algebra – it is left up to you to decide which algebraic steps are the most important ones to display.) **(Note: You should impose symmetric equilibrium within each group but NOT IMPOSE SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM ACROSS GROUPS in constructing the economy’s average nominal price.)**

## 2. Monopolistic Competition and Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Flexible-Price Model.

Suppose there is a measure  $[0, 1]$  of differentiated monopolistically-competitive firms, all prices are flexible (i.e., there are no nominal price rigidities), and that the representative final goods firm’s production function is

$$y_t = \left[ \int_0^1 y_{it}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}},$$

with  $1 < \varepsilon < \infty$ . Each monopolistically-competitive firm operates a linear-in-labor production technology with zero sunk costs, and the labor market is (from the perspective of monopolistically-competitive firms) a perfectly-competitive Walrasian labor market. In a symmetric equilibrium, the real wage is smaller than the marginal product of labor.

The representative household’s lifetime utility function is

$$E_0 \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, n_t) \right\}$$

with period-t budget constraint

$$c_t + T_t = (1 - \tau_t^n) w_t n_t.$$

Period-t labor is denoted by  $n_t$ , period-t consumption is denoted by  $c_t$ , the period-t real wage is denoted by  $w_t$ , the period-t lump-sum tax is denoted by  $T_t$ , and the period-t proportional labor income tax rate is denoted by  $\tau_t^n$ . The properties of the period-t utility are  $u_c(c_t, n_t) > 0$ ,  $u_{cc}(c_t, n_t) < 0$ ,  $u_n(c_t, n_t) < 0$ ,  $u_{nn}(c_t, n_t) > 0$ , and  $u_{cn}(c_t, n_t) = 0$ .

Is there a proportional labor income tax rate  $\tau_t^n \neq 0$  that equates the representative household's marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption ( $mrs_t$ ) with the marginal product of labor  $mpn_t$ ? If there is, compute it and **clearly display the final solution by drawing a box around it**. If there is not, carefully show why not.

Regardless of whether or not there is a labor income tax rate  $\tau_t^n \neq 0$  that equates the representative household's marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption ( $mrs_t$ ) with the marginal product of labor  $mpn_t$ , clearly and carefully provide important algebraic steps/logic that lead to the solution. (No need to display each and every step of the algebra – it is left up to you to decide which algebraic steps are the most important ones to display.)