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# **OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY**

**APRIL 13, 2017**

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# BASICS OF RAMSEY ANALYSIS

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- **Ramsey (1927 *Economic Journal*)**

## A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF TAXATION

THE problem I propose to tackle is this: a given revenue is to be raised by proportionate taxes on some or all uses of income, the taxes on different uses being possibly at different rates; how should these rates be adjusted in order that the decrement of utility may be a minimum?

- **Stiglitz (2014 NBER working paper)**
  - **Pros and cons of Ramsey taxation framework**
  - **“In Praise of Frank Ramsey’s Contribution to the Theory of Taxation”**

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- ❑ **Maintained assumptions**
  - ❑ **Lack of lump-sum taxes (the starting point of Ramsey 1927)**
  - ❑ **Completeness** of set of proportional tax instruments
  - ❑ **Completeness of government debt markets**
    - ❑ **Fully state-contingent set of government bonds issued in  $t$ , only one yields return depending on realized state in  $t+1$**

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- ❑ **Completeness** of tax instruments?
  - ❑ **Suppose three distinct goods, each with proportional tax rate**
  - ❑ **Household optimality conditions**

$$\frac{u_1(c_1, c_2, c_3)}{u_2(c_1, c_2, c_3)} = \frac{(1 - \tau_1) \cdot p_1}{(1 - \tau_2) \cdot p_2} \qquad \frac{u_2(c_1, c_2, c_3)}{u_3(c_1, c_2, c_3)} = \frac{(1 - \tau_2) \cdot p_2}{(1 - \tau_3) \cdot p_3}$$

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  - ❑ **Completeness of tax instruments exists if, given a Ramsey allocation**
    - ❑ **There is  $\geq$  one tax rate on each MRS = price ratio condition and...**
    - ❑ **...there is a unique mapping from the Ramsey allocation to a set of tax rates**

# BASICS OF RAMSEY MACRO FISCAL POLICY

## □ Ramsey problem

$$\max_{\{c_t, n_t, k_{t+1}\}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t) - h(n_t)] \quad \text{s.t.}$$

$$c_t + g_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = z_t f(k_t, n_t)$$

Sequence of Lagrange  
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$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u'(c_t) \cdot c_t - h'(n_t) \cdot n_t] = A_0$$


  
 Define as  $W(c_t, n_t)$

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□ Ramsey FOCs (for  $t > 0$ , which sidesteps issue of taxation of  $t = 0$  initial capital stock and other assets, of which  $A_0$  is a function)

□ Commitment by Ramsey government to its  $t > 0$  policies at  $t = 0$

□ Discretionary Ramsey government does not commit to its  $t > 0$  policies at  $t = 0$



# BASICS OF RAMSEY MACRO FISCAL POLICY

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$$\begin{aligned} u'(c_t^{RP}) - \lambda_t^{RP} + \mu \cdot W_c(c_t^{RP}, n_t^{RP}) &= 0 \\ -h'(n_t^{RP}) + \lambda_t^{RP} z_t f_n(k_t^{RP}, n_t^{RP}) + \mu \cdot W_n(c_t^{RP}, n_t^{RP}) &= 0 \\ -\lambda_t^{RP} + \beta E_t \left\{ \lambda_{t+1}^{RP} \left[ z_{t+1} f_k(k_{t+1}^{RP}, n_{t+1}^{RP}) + 1 - \delta \right] \right\} &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

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- **Social Planner FOCs**

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 u'(c_t^{SP}) - \lambda_t^{SP} &= 0 \\
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 \end{aligned}$$

↓  
Evaluate at deterministic  
steady states

## BASICS OF RAMSEY MACRO FISCAL POLICY

- **Ramsey FOCs (for  $t > 0$ ) at deterministic steady state**

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 u'(c^{RP}) - \lambda^{RP} + \mu \cdot W_c(c^{RP}, n^{RP}) &= 0 \\
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# BASICS OF RAMSEY MACRO FISCAL POLICY

## □ Ramsey FOCs (for $t > 0$ ) at deterministic steady state

$$u'(c^{RP}) - \lambda^{RP} + \mu \cdot W_c(c^{RP}, n^{RP}) = 0 \quad (1)$$

$$-h'(n^{RP}) + \lambda^{RP} z \cdot f_n(k^{RP}, n^{RP}) + \mu \cdot W_n(c^{RP}, n^{RP}) = 0 \quad (2)$$

$$-\cancel{\lambda^{RP}} + \beta \cancel{\lambda^{RP}} \left[ z \cdot f_k(k^{RP}, n^{RP}) + 1 - \delta \right] = 0 \quad (3)$$

## □ Social Planner FOCs at deterministic steady state

$$u'(c^{SP}) - \lambda^{SP} = 0 \quad (4)$$

$$-h'(n^{SP}) + \lambda^{SP} z \cdot f_n(k^{SP}, n^{SP}) = 0 \quad (5)$$

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- **(3) and (6) imply Ramsey-optimal  $k/n$  ratio = efficient  $k/n$  ratio**
  - (Given maintained assumption of CRS production  $f(\cdot)$ )
  - **A crucial result!**
  - **Second-best  $k/n$  ratio = first-best  $k/n$  ratio**
  - **Chamley (1986 ECTA), Judd (1985 JPub) seminal references**

# ZERO CAPITAL INCOME TAX

- What does this imply for Ramsey-optimal tax rates?
- Recall household optimization
  - With labor income tax and capital income tax (and no lump-sum taxes)

$$\max_{\{c_t, n_t, k_{t+1}\}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t) - h(n_t)] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad c_t + k_{t+1} = (1 - \tau_t^n) w_t n_t + [1 + (1 - \tau_t^k)(r_t - \delta)] k_t$$

- Steady-state consumption-labor optimality (labor supply condition)

$$\frac{h'(n)}{u'(c)} = (1 - \tau^n) z \cdot f_n(k, n)$$

← =  $w$  in equilibrium

- Steady-state consumption-savings optimality (capital Euler condition)

$$\cancel{u'(c)} = \beta \cancel{u'(c)} \left( 1 + (1 - \tau^k) (z \cdot f_k(k, n) - \delta) \right)$$

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- ❑ **Ramsey-optimal capital income tax rate = 0!**
- ❑ Don't tax intertemporal margin at all in the long run...
- ❑ ...even though Ramsey government has to raise revenue through distortionary taxes



## POSITIVE LABOR INCOME TAX

### □ What does this imply for Ramsey-optimal tax rates?

#### □ Steady-state consumption-labor optimality (labor supply condition)

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#### □ **Ramsey-optimal capital income tax rate = 0!**

#### □ Don't tax intertemporal margin at all in the long run...

#### □ ...even though Ramsey government has to raise revenue through distortionary taxes

### □ **All revenue must be raised through positive labor income tax**

### □ **Two central Ramsey macro fiscal policy results**

## DYNAMICS OF TAX RATES

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- ❑ **Outside the steady state?**
- ❑ **Focus on labor income tax rate (simple to consider)**
  - ❑ **Consumption-labor optimality (labor supply condition)**

$$\frac{h'(n_t)}{u'(c_t)} = (1 - \tau_t^n) z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)$$

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$$\underbrace{\frac{h'(n_t)}{u'(c_t)}}_{= MRS_t} = (1 - \tau_t^n) \underbrace{z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)}_{= MPN_t}$$

$$\rightarrow MRS_t = (1 - \tau_t^n) MPN_t$$

- ❑ Labor income tax is a **wedge** between labor supply and labor demand

- ❑ Along the business cycle?

- ❑ Consider utility form  $u(c_t) - h(n_t) = \ln c_t - \frac{\kappa}{1 + 1/\iota} n_t^{1 + 1/\iota}$ 
  - $\iota$  is labor supply elasticity with respect to real wage

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- **Compute first and second derivatives of  $u(\cdot)$  and  $h(\cdot)$ ...**
  - **...which are needed to compute  $W_c(\cdot)$  and  $W_n(\cdot)$**
- **Do some algebra combining the Ramsey FOCs ...**

# DYNAMICS OF TAX RATES

- **Along the business cycle?**

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$$\underbrace{\kappa \cdot n_t^{1/l} \cdot c_t}_{= \text{MRS}_t} = \underbrace{\left[ 1 + \mu \left( \frac{1+l}{l} \right) \right]^{-1}}_{= \text{wedge between MRS}_t \text{ and MPN}_t} \cdot \underbrace{z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)}_{= \text{MPN}_t}$$

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- Wedge is a (endogenous...) constant between MRS and MPN in every time period

- $\mu = 0$  (the case of lump-sum taxes)  $\rightarrow$  wedge = 0
  - $\mu > 0$  (the Ramsey case)  $\rightarrow$  wedge  $\neq 0$

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  - **Nearly constant if move to slightly different  $h(n)$  function**

## DYNAMICS OF TAX RATES


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  - Nearly constant if move to slightly different  $h(n)$  function
- **Labor income tax smoothing**
  - Key Ramsey macro fiscal policy result
  - Keep deadweight losses constant across markets over time
    - aka **wedges** constant



# TAX SMOOTHING VS. WEDGE SMOOTHING



- Ramsey wants to keep these wedges constant

$$MRS_t = \text{WEDGE}_t \cdot MPN_t \quad \forall t$$

Wedge (Walrasian  
labor market)

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# **GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WEDGES**

**APRIL 13, 2017**

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# TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION

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□ **Construct model-consistent transformation function**

"The production set is taken as a primitive datum of the theory...If [the transformation function]  $F(\cdot)$  is differentiable, and if the production vector  $y$  satisfies  $F(y) = 0$ , then for any commodities  $l$  and  $k$ , the ratio

$$MRT_{l,k}(y) = \frac{\partial F(y) / \partial y_l}{\partial F(y) / \partial y_k}$$

is called the *marginal rate of transformation (MRT) of good  $l$  for good  $k$  at vector  $y$* ...

*Microeconomic Theory, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (p. 128 – 130)*

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**...A single-output technology is commonly described by means of a production function  $f(z)$ ...Holding the level of output fixed, we can define the *marginal rate of technical substitution ( $MRTS_{l,k}$ )* ... Note that  $MRTS_{l,k}$  is simply a renaming of the marginal rate of transformation...in the special case of a single-output technology."**

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## □ RBC model

### □ Does one-unit decrease in $1-n_t$ affect $c_t$ ?

□ **If so, how?**

### □ Does one-unit decrease in $c_t$ affect $c_{t+1}$ ?

□ **If so, how?**

# TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION

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- ❑ Transformation function of RBC model

$$c_t + g_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = z_t f(k_t, n_t) \quad \text{Goods resource constraint}$$

- ❑ One-unit decrease in  $1 - n_t \rightarrow$  one-unit increase in  $n_t$
- ❑ One-unit increase in  $n_t \rightarrow$  output increases by  $z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)$  units

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- One-unit increase in  $n_t \rightarrow$  output increases by  $z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)$  units
- Increase of output by  $z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)$  units  $\rightarrow c_t$  increases by  $z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)$  units

$$MRT_{c_t, n_t} \equiv z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)$$

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$$\square \quad MRT_{c_t, n_t} \equiv z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)$$

### □ Does one-unit decrease in $c_t$ affect $c_{t+1}$ ?

□ **If so, how?**



# TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION

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- Transformation function of RBC model (between  $t$  and  $t + 1$ )

$$c_t + g_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = z_t f(k_t, n_t) \quad c_{t+1} + g_{t+1} + k_{t+2} - (1 - \delta)k_{t+1} = z_{t+1} f(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1})$$

- One-unit decrease in  $c_t \rightarrow$  one-unit increase in  $k_{t+1}$

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- One-unit decrease in  $c_t \rightarrow$  one-unit increase in  $k_{t+1}$
- One-unit increase in  $k_{t+1} \rightarrow$  output increases by  $z_{t+1} f_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1})$  units
- Increase of output by  $z_{t+1} f_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1})$  units
- $\rightarrow c_{t+1}$  increases by

$$MRT_{c_t, c_{t+1}} \equiv 1 + z_{t+1} f_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) - \delta$$

# TRANSFORMATION FUNCTION

## □ Construct model-consistent transformation function

"The production set is taken as a primitive datum of the theory...If [the transformation function]  $F(\cdot)$  is differentiable, and if the production vector  $y$  satisfies  $F(y) = 0$ , then for any commodities  $l$  and  $k$ , the ratio

$$MRT_{l,k}(y) = \frac{\partial F(y) / \partial y_l}{\partial F(y) / \partial y_k}$$

is called the *marginal rate of transformation (MRT) of good  $l$  for good  $k$  at vector  $y$* ...

...A single-output technology is commonly described by means of a *production function*  $f(z)$ ...Holding the level of output fixed, we can define the *marginal rate of technical substitution* ( $MRTS_{l,k}$ ) ... Note that  $MRTS_{l,k}$  is simply a renaming of the marginal rate of transformation...in the special case of a single-output technology."

*Microeconomic Theory, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (p. 128 – 130)*

## □ RBC model

### □ Does one-unit decrease in $1-n_t$ affect $c_t$ ?

$$\square \quad MRT_{c_t, n_t} \equiv z_t f_n(k_t, n_t)$$

### □ Does one-unit decrease in $c_t$ affect $c_{t+1}$ ?

$$\square \quad MRT_{c_t, c_{t+1}} \equiv 1 + z_{t+1} f_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) - \delta$$