

THE FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE MACROECONOMY

NOVEMBER 28, 2011

Introduction

FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR

- ❑ **“Financial accelerator” framework**
 - ❑ The most widely-used and applied framework in macroeconomic theory and policy for thinking about financial markets
 - ❑ Developed in series of studies by Bernanke and Gertler in late 1980's and early 1990's
- ❑ **Popular-press language**
 - ❑ “Financial accelerator”
 - ❑ “Financial feedback loops”
 - ❑ “Loan spirals”
- ❑ **Describes well many of the financial-macroeconomic linkages underpinning the dynamics of**
 - ❑ The Great Depression
 - ❑ Current macroeconomic conditions
- ❑ **Will develop idea in context of firm theory (Chapter 6)**
- ❑ **Can also develop idea in context of consumer theory (Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 8)**
 - ❑ Recall “credit constraint” analysis of consumption/savings decisions (Chapter 3 and 4)

OUTLINE OF FRAMEWORK

Major ideas underlying Financial Accelerator Framework

1. Firms' **financial** assets (i.e., stocks and bonds) matter for their ability to purchase **physical** assets (i.e., machines and equipment)
2. Market **prices** of financial assets matter for **firm financing constraints**
3. Government regulation affects the linkage between financial markets and real (i.e., goods and physical capital) markets through financing constraints


OUTLINE OF FRAMEWORK

Four Building Blocks of the Financial Accelerator Framework

1. Two-Period Model of Firm Profit Maximization
 - ❑ Based on Chapter 6
 - ❑ Enriched to allow for both **physical** assets (machines and equipment) and **financial** assets (stocks and bonds)
2. Financing Constraint – **conceptually the key building block**
 - ❑ Quantity of **physical** capital firms can purchase depends on the market value of their **financial** assets
 - ❑ Reflects market and regulatory structures designed to mitigate **informational asymmetries**
 - ❑ (Recall basic Chapter 6 theory of firms featured no constraints on firm profit maximization)
3. Government Regulation/Oversight of Financial Relationships
4. Relationship between Firm Profits and Dividends

BASIC FIRM THEORY

Timeline of events



Notation


- k_1 : capital used for production in period 1 (decided upon in "period 0")
- n_1 : labor used for production in period 1
- w_1 : real wage rate for labor in period 1 ($w_1 = W_1/P_1$)
- i : nominal interest rate (between period 1 and period 2)
- P_1 : nominal price of output produced and sold by firm in period 1
AND nominal price of one unit of capital bought by the firm in period 1 for use in period 2

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ENRICHING THE BASIC FIRM THEORY

Timeline of events



Notation


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 - n_1 : labor used for production in period 1
 - w_1 : real wage rate for labor in period 1 ($w_1 = W_1/P_1$)
 - i : nominal interest rate (between period 1 and period 2)
 - P_1 : nominal price of output produced and sold by firm in period 1
AND nominal price of one unit of capital bought by the firm in period 1 for use in period 2
 - a_0 : real wealth (stock) holdings at beginning of period 1/end of period 0
 - S_1 : nominal price of a unit of stock in period 1
 - D_1 : nominal dividend paid in period 1 by each unit of stock held at the start of period 1
- The "defining features" of stock are indicated by a bracket next to S_1 and D_1 .

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ENRICHING THE BASIC FIRM THEORY

Timeline of events



Notation

- ☐ k_2 : capital used for production in period 2 (decided upon in period 1)
- ☐ n_2 : labor used for production in period 2
- ☐ w_2 : real wage rate for labor in period 2 ($w_2 = W_2/P_2$)
- ☐ i : nominal interest rate (between period 1 and period 2)
- ☐ P_2 : nominal price of output produced and sold by firm in period 2
AND nominal price of one unit of capital bought by the firm in period 2 for use in period 3
- ☐ a_1 : real wealth (stock) holdings at beginning of period 2/end of period 1
- ☐ S_2 : nominal price of a unit of stock in period 2
- ☐ D_2 : nominal dividend paid in period 2 by each unit of stock held at the start of period 2
- ☐ n_2 : net inflation rate between period 1 and period 2 (recall: $n_2 = P_2/P_1 - 1$)

The "defining features" of stock

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RATES OF RETURN

- ☐ "Interest rates" can be defined for any type of asset
 - ☐ There is no single interest rate in the economy
- ☐ Interpret/understand the two types of "interest rates" that co-exist in this richer framework of firm profit maximization
 - ☐ i : nominal interest rate on bonds
 - ☐ Recall from Chapter 14

$$1+i = \frac{1}{P_1^b}$$
 - ☐ Thus can think of bonds (one type of financial asset) as being in the background of the analysis
 - ☐ i^{STOCK} : nominal return on stock – i.e., "interest rate on stock" (though bad terminology)
 - ☐ Define according to

$$1+i^{STOCK} = \frac{S_2 + D_2}{S_1}$$
 - ☐ Measures the net dollar return (in period 2) on one share of stock (whose purchase price was S_1 in period 1)

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RATES OF RETURN

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 - ❑ **i : nominal interest rate on bonds**
 - ❑ Recall from Chapter 14

$1+i = \frac{1}{P^b}$
← can rewrite as →
 $i = \frac{1}{P^b} - 1$
← express as real interest rate →
 $1+r = \frac{1+i}{1+\pi}$

REAL INTEREST RATE ON GOVERNMENT BONDS: A "RISKLESS" ASSET
 - ❑ Thus can think of bonds (one type of financial asset) as being in the background of the analysis
 - ❑ **i^{STOCK} : nominal return on stock – i.e., "interest rate on stock" (though bad terminology)**
 - ❑ Define according to

$1+i^{STOCK} = \frac{S_2 + D_2}{S_1}$
← can rewrite as →
 $i^{STOCK} = \frac{S_2 + D_2}{S_1} - 1$
← express as real interest rate →
 $1+r^{STOCK} = \frac{1+i^{STOCK}}{1+\pi}$

REAL INTEREST RATE ON STOCKS: A "RISKY" ASSET
 - ❑ Measures the net dollar return (in period 2) on one share of stock (whose purchase price was S_1 in period 1)
- ❑ **Can distinguish two measures of real interest rates in this framework**

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FIRM PROFIT FUNCTION

- ❑ **A dynamic profit maximization problem**
 - ❑ Because firm exists for both periods
 - ❑ All analysis conducted from the perspective of the very beginning of period 1
 - ❑ → Must consider present-discounted-value (PDV) of lifetime (i.e., two-period) profits
- ❑ **Dynamic profit function**
 - ❑ (specified in nominal terms – could specify in real terms...)

Period-1 profits

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1)a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1$$

⏟

Total revenue in period 1 (price x output)

⏟

Value of pre-existing physical capital (an asset for firms)

⏟

Value (inclusive of dividends) of pre-existing financial assets (i.e., stock-holdings in other firms)

⏟

Total labor cost in period 1

⏟

Total cost of buying physical capital for period 2 (time to build → must purchase period-2 capital in period 1)

⏟

Total cost of buying financial assets (i.e., stock-holdings in other firms) for period 2

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FIRM PROFIT FUNCTION

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- **Dynamic profit function**
 - (specified in nominal terms – could specify in real terms...)

As usual: no physical or financial assets needed for "period 3"

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{Period-1 profits} \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{(PDV of) period-2 profits} \\
 \hline
 P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1)a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2)a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 k_3}{1+i} - \frac{S_2 a_2}{1+i} \\
 \hline
 \begin{array}{llllllll}
 \text{Total revenue in period 1 (price x output)} & \text{Value of pre-existing physical capital (an asset for firms)} & \text{Total labor cost in period 1} & \text{Total cost of buying physical capital for period 2 (time to build → must purchase period-2 capital in period 1)} & \text{Total revenue in period 2 (price x output)} & \text{Value of pre-existing physical capital (an asset for firms)} & \text{Total labor cost in period 2} & \text{Total cost of buying physical capital for period 3 (time to build → must purchase period-3 capital in period 2)} \\
 \end{array} \\
 \hline
 \begin{array}{llll}
 \text{Value (inclusive of dividends) of pre-existing financial assets (i.e., stock-holdings in other firms)} & \text{Total cost of buying financial assets (i.e., stock-holdings in other firms) for period 2} & \text{Value (inclusive of dividends) of pre-existing financial assets (i.e., stock-holdings in other firms)} & \text{Total cost of buying financial assets (i.e., stock-holdings in other firms) for period 3}
 \end{array}
 \end{array}$$

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INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES

- **"Informational asymmetries" pervasive in borrowing/lending relationships**
- **Borrower (whether consumer, firm, or financial institution) *much* more likely to know his own ability/willingness to repay a loan**
 - Lenders only know little about the "quality" or "trustworthiness" of a borrower
 - **Asymmetry of information – cannot be eliminated**
- **To mitigate *consequences* of informational asymmetries, lenders often require borrower to have a stake in "succeeding" in the project/purpose for which funds are being borrowed**
 - **Consumers**
 - e.g., down payment on house purchase
 - e.g., down payment on car purchase
 - **If stop making payments on house or car**
 - Borrower loses down payment (in addition to the car or house...)...
 - **Affects individual's incentives *before* borrowing**

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- ❑ To mitigate **consequences** of informational asymmetries, lenders often require borrower to have a stake in "succeeding" in the project/purpose for which funds are being borrowed
 - ❑ Consumers
 - ❑ e.g., down payment on house purchase
 - ❑ e.g., down payment on car purchase
 - ❑ Total amount of loan (typically) depends on individual's collateral
 - ❑ Firms
 - ❑ Capital investment (factories, technology upgrades, etc) outlays
 - ❑ Payroll outlays
 - ❑ Financing inventories
 - ❑ Total amount of loan (typically) depends on firm's collateral
 - ❑ Financial institutions: borrow in order to make (big) loans
 - ❑ By raising "small" quantities of funds from many different sources

Working capital

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FINANCING CONSTRAINT

- ❑ Capture this idea through a **financing constraint** on firm's ability to purchase capital between period 1 and period 2
- ❑ Financing constraint
 - ❑ Total expenditures on period-1 physical investment must be equal to market value of firm's financial (stock) holdings
 - ❑ (Technically, smaller than or equal to, so an inequality constraint...but will formally analyze constraint with equality)

$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 P_1 \cdot inv_1 & = & S_1 \cdot a_1 \\
 \downarrow & & \text{inv}_1 = k_2 - k_1 \text{ (investment is change in quantity of physical capital)} \\
 P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) & = & S_1 \cdot a_1
 \end{array}$$

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$$P_1 \cdot inv_1 = S_1 \cdot a_1$$

↓
 $inv_1 = k_2 - k_1$ (investment is change in quantity of physical capital)

$$P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) = S_1 \cdot a_1$$

- ❑ **Important: a_1 appears in the financing constraint, *not* a_0**
 - ❑ Idea this assumption captures: firm might try to strategically manipulate the value of *financial* assets it holds in order to affect the quantity of *physical* investment it can engage in
 - ❑ (From the perspective of beginning of period 1, a_1 has not yet been chosen, whereas a_0 is pre-determined)

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GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL MARKETS

- ❑ **Government oversight of informational asymmetries in borrower/lender relationships**
 - ❑ Filing of proper documentation
 - ❑ Full disclosure ("truth-in-lending") laws
 - ❑ Direct lending in some markets
 - ❑ ...
- ❑ **Capture government Regulation of financial dealings in our framework in very simple way**
 - ❑ Firm can only borrow up to a multiple **R** of the market value of its financial assets for physical investment purposes
 - ❑ e.g., if government regulates that expenditures on investment cannot be larger than 5 times market value of financial assets, **$R = 5$**
- ❑ **Terminology: R is leverage ratio**
 - ❑ Will think of it as government regulation...
 - ❑ ...but can and does also reflect market and institutional arrangements

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GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL MARKETS

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 P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) &= S_1 \cdot a_1 \\
 \downarrow \text{Government regulation of leverage } R \\
 \boxed{P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) = R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1} & \quad \text{Impose this financing constraint on firm profit maximization problem}
 \end{aligned}$$

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FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR FRAMEWORK

- **Four Building Blocks of the Financial Accelerator Framework**

1. Firm Profit Function

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1) a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2) a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 k_3}{1+i} - \frac{S_2 a_2}{1+i}$$

$\xrightarrow{=0}$ $\xrightarrow{=0}$

2. Financing Constraint

$$P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) = S_1 \cdot a_1$$

3. Government Regulation of Financial Relationships (imposition of R on financing constraint)

$$P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) = R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1$$

4. Relationship between firm profits and dividends

LATER

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FIRM PROFIT MAXIMIZATION

Maximize two-period profits

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1) a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2) a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 k_3}{1+i} - \frac{S_2 a_2}{1+i}$$

Subject to financing constraint

$$P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) = R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1$$

Construct Lagrangian

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1) a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2) a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} + \lambda [R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1 - P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1)]$$

Lagrange multiplier on financing constraint

CRUCIAL OBSERVATION: in basic firm theory (i.e., Chapter 6), value of this multiplier was....

$\lambda = 0$ i.e., there was no financing constraint!

LATER: will study which regulatory and/or market features make the financing constraint effectively 'disappear' (i.e., cause $\lambda = 0$)

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FIRM PROFIT MAXIMIZATION

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1) a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2) a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} + \lambda [R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1 - P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1)]$$

FOCs with respect to n_1, n_2

Identical except for time subscripts

with respect to n_1 :

$$P_1 f_n(k_1, n_1) - P_1 w_1 = 0$$

Equation 1

with respect to n_2 :

$$\frac{P_2 f_n(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2}{1+i} = 0$$

Equation 2

- Financing constraint does not affect profit-maximizing choices of labor hiring...
- ...thus same analysis from Chapter 6 of labor demand curve, etc, applies

FOCs with respect to k_2, a_1

- The interesting aspects of the framework
- The heart of the financial accelerator framework

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FIRM PROFIT MAXIMIZATION

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1) a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2) a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} + \lambda [R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1 - P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1)]$$

□ FOCs with respect to k_2, a_1

with respect to k_2 : $-P_1 + \frac{P_2 f_k(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2}{1+i} - \lambda P_1 = 0$ Equation 3

with respect to a_1 : $-S_1 + \frac{S_2 + D_2}{1+i} + \lambda \cdot R \cdot S_1 = 0$ Equation 4

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FIRM PROFIT MAXIMIZATION

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1) a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2) a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} + \lambda [R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1 - P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1)]$$

□ FOCs with respect to k_2, a_1

with respect to k_2 : $-P_1 + \frac{P_2 f_k(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2}{1+i} - \lambda P_1 = 0$ Equation 3

with respect to a_1 : $-S_1 + \frac{S_2 + D_2}{1+i} + \lambda \cdot R \cdot S_1 = 0$ Equation 4

□ Analysis of Equation 4 in isolation

- Answers the central question: under what conditions does $\lambda = 0$?
- Reveals how stock market returns affect financing constraints
- Reveals how government regulation affects financing constraints

□ Analysis of Equation 3 and Equation 4 jointly

- Demonstrates how/why financial market prices (i.e., stock prices/returns) matter for macroeconomic activity
- The financial accelerator effect

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WHY IS FINANCING A *CONSTRAINT*?

$$-S_1 + \frac{S_2 + D_2}{1+i} + \lambda \cdot R \cdot S_1 = 0 \quad \text{Equation 4}$$

Solve for λ

$$\lambda = \left[S_1 - \frac{S_2 + D_2}{1+i} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R \cdot S_1}$$

Pull $1/S_1$ term inside

$$\lambda = \left[1 - \frac{S_2 + D_2}{S_1} \cdot \frac{1}{1+i} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R}$$

Multiply and divide second term in parentheses by P_1 and P_2

$$\lambda = \left[1 - \frac{S_2 + D_2}{S_1} \cdot \frac{P_1}{P_2} \cdot \frac{1}{P_1} \cdot \frac{1}{1+i} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R}$$

Use definition of inflation, $1 + \pi_2 = P_2 / P_1$, and regroup terms

$$\lambda = \left[1 - \frac{S_2 + D_2}{S_1} \cdot \frac{P_1}{P_2} \cdot \frac{1 + \pi_2}{1+i} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R}$$

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WHY IS FINANCING A *CONSTRAINT*?

$$\lambda = \left[1 - \frac{S_2 + D_2}{S_1} \cdot \frac{P_1}{P_2} \cdot \frac{1 + \pi_2}{1+i} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R} \quad (\text{from previous page})$$

Use definition of "nominal interest rate on stock", $1 + r^{\text{STOCK}} = (S_2 + D_2) / S_1$
Use definition of inflation, $1 + \pi_2 = P_2 / P_1$

$$\lambda = \left[1 - \frac{1 + r^{\text{STOCK}}}{1 + \pi_2} \cdot \frac{1 + \pi_2}{1+i} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R}$$

Fisher equation for stock: $1 + r^{\text{STOCK}} = (1 + \beta^{\text{STOCK}}) / (1 + \pi_2)$
Fisher equation for bonds: $1 + r = (1 + i) / (1 + \pi_2)$

$$\lambda = \left[1 - \frac{1 + r^{\text{STOCK}}}{1 + r} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R}$$

Final rewrite!

$$\lambda = \left[\frac{r - r^{\text{STOCK}}}{1 + r} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R} \quad \text{The Lagrange multiplier on firm's financing constraint}$$

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WHY IS FINANCING A *CONSTRAINT*?

$$\lambda = \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1 + r} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R} \quad \text{The Lagrange multiplier on firms' financing constraint}$$

□ **Basic firm theory (Chapter 6)**

□ **No financing constraint**

□ **Can interpret basic firm theory analysis as featuring $\lambda = 0$**

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1) a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2) a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} \\ + \lambda [R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1 - P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1)] \\ = 0$$

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WHY IS FINANCING A *CONSTRAINT*?

$$\lambda = \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1 + r} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R} \quad \text{The Lagrange multiplier on firms' financing constraint}$$

□ **Basic firm theory (Chapter 6)**

□ **No financing constraint**

□ **Can interpret basic firm theory analysis as featuring $\lambda = 0$**

□ **Interpretation: under "normal market conditions," financing constraints don't matter (much...)**

□ **Identify "normal market conditions" as steady state**

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1) a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2) a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} \\ + \lambda [R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1 - P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1)] \\ = 0$$

□ **If $\lambda = 0$ (i.e., "normal market conditions," aka steady state)**

□ **Labor demand decisions unaffected by financial market conditions**

□ **Capital demand decisions unaffected by financial market conditions**

□ **Key question: what causes $\lambda = 0$?**

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WHY IS FINANCING A CONSTRAINT?

$$\lambda = \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1 + r} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R}$$

The Lagrange multiplier on firms' financing constraint

Two conditions for $\lambda = 0$

- Can think of both government bonds (financial assets) and machines & equipment (physical assets) as "riskless": you (pretty much...) know what you're going to get from them.
- Market returns on risky assets **equal** returns on riskless assets
 - Risky assets: stocks
 - Riskless assets
 - Bonds (financial)
 - Machines and equipment (physical) – most directly relevant for firms' production and sales activity
 - Basic firm theory prediction: $r = mpk$
- $r = r^{STOCK} \longrightarrow \lambda = 0$
- Interpretation: if returns on financial assets are aligned with returns on physical assets, financing constraints "don't matter"

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WHY IS FINANCING A CONSTRAINT?

$$\lambda = \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1 + r} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R}$$

The Lagrange multiplier on firms' financing constraint

Two conditions for $\lambda = 0$

- Can think of both government bonds (financial assets) and machines & equipment (physical assets) as "riskless": you (pretty much...) know what you're going to get from them.
- Market returns on risky assets **equal** returns on riskless assets
 - Risky assets: stocks
 - Riskless assets
 - Bonds (financial)
 - Machines and equipment (physical) – most directly relevant for firms' production and sales activity
 - Basic firm theory prediction: $r = mpk$

$r = r^{STOCK} \longrightarrow \lambda = 0$

Interpretation: if returns on financial assets are aligned with returns on physical assets, financing constraints "don't matter"

 - Government oversight of borrowing/lending relationships very lax
 - The larger is R , the lower is λ
 - Financing constraint: $P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) = R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1$

Market value of financial assets

In practice, not literally infinity... $R = \infty \longrightarrow \lambda = 0$

Interpretation: if government regulations allow high borrowing with little assets, financing constraints "don't matter"
 - Holding constant market value of financial assets, higher R allows higher k_2

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FINANCING CONSTRAINT AND CAPITAL DEMAND

- Suppose $R = 1$ in "steady state" (but keep R in rest of analysis)
 - $R > 1$ is "lax regulation" (because it lowers λ , all else constant)
 - $R < 1$ is "tight regulation" (because it increases λ , all else constant)
 - → Whether or not financing constraint matters (i.e., whether or not $\lambda = 0$) all depends on whether or not $r^{STOCK} = r$ or not

KEY IDEA: if returns on riskless assets = returns on risky assets → financing constraints "don't matter" for firm production decisions

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FINANCING CONSTRAINT AND CAPITAL DEMAND

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KEY IDEA: if returns on riskless assets = returns on risky assets → financing constraints "don't matter" for firm production decisions

$$-P_1 + \frac{P_2 f_k(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2}{1+i} - \lambda P_1 = 0 \quad \text{Equation 3 (FOC on } k_2)$$

$$\lambda = \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1+r} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R} \quad \text{Equation 4 (FOC on } a_1)$$

- Basic firm theory (Chapter 6)
 - Capital demand function derived from Equation 3
 - Idea same as in Chapter 6...but now complicated by the financing constraint

Substitute λ from Equation 4 into Equation 3

$$-P_1 + \frac{P_2 f_k(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2}{1+i} - \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1+r} \right] \frac{1}{R} P_1 = 0$$

Rearrange

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FINANCING CONSTRAINT AND CAPITAL DEMAND

$$-P_1 + \frac{P_2 f_k(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2}{1+i} - \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1+r} \right] \frac{1}{R} P_1 = 0 \quad (\text{from previous page})$$

Divide by P_1

$$\frac{P_2 f_k(k_2, n_2)}{P_1(1+i)} + \frac{P_2}{P_1(1+i)} - \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1+r} \right] \frac{1}{R} = 1$$

Use definition of inflation, $1 + \pi_2 = P_2 / P_1$

$$\left(\frac{1 + \pi_2}{1+i} \right) f_k(k_2, n_2) + \frac{1 + \pi_2}{1+i} - \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1+r} \right] \frac{1}{R} = 1$$

Apply Fisher relation for "riskless" assets

$$\frac{f_k(k_2, n_2)}{1+r} + \frac{1}{1+r} - \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1+r} \right] \frac{1}{R} = 1$$

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FINANCING CONSTRAINT AND CAPITAL DEMAND

$$-P_1 + \frac{P_2 f_k(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2}{1+i} - \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1+r} \right] \frac{1}{R} P_1 = 0 \quad (\text{from previous page})$$

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Apply Fisher relation for "riskless" assets

$$\frac{f_k(k_2, n_2)}{1+r} + \frac{1}{1+r} - \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1+r} \right] \frac{1}{R} = 1$$

Multiply by $(1+r)$

Marginal product of capital, mpk

$$f_k(k_2, n_2) + \cancel{1} - \frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{R} = \cancel{1} + r$$

Suppose $R = 1$ in "steady state" but keep R in the analysis

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COBB-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION

- Commonly-used functional form in quantitative macroeconomic analysis

$$f(k, n) = k^\alpha n^{1-\alpha}$$

- Describes the empirical relationship between aggregate GDP, aggregate capital, and aggregate labor quite well
- $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ measures **capital's share of output**
 - Hence $(1-\alpha) \in (0, 1)$ measures **labor's share of output**
 - Interpretation
 - The relative importance of (either) capital (or labor) in the production process
 - Estimates for U.S. economy: $\alpha \approx 0.3$
 - Estimates for Chinese economy: $\alpha \approx 0.15$ (not (yet) a very capital-rich economy)
- Cobb-Douglas form useful for illustrating factor demands
 - $mpn = f_n(k, n) = (1-\alpha)k^\alpha n^{-\alpha}$
 - $mpk = f_k(k, n) = \alpha k^{\alpha-1} n^{1-\alpha}$

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FINANCING CONSTRAINT AND CAPITAL DEMAND

- Firm-level demand for capital **defined** by the relation

$$r = \alpha k^{\alpha-1} n^{1-\alpha} - \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{R} \right] \left(= mpk - \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{R} \right] \right)$$

$$r = \alpha k^{\alpha-1} n^{1-\alpha} - \frac{r}{R} + \frac{r^{STOCK}}{R}$$

$$\left[1 + \frac{1}{R} \right] r = \alpha k^{\alpha-1} n^{1-\alpha} + \frac{r^{STOCK}}{R}$$

$$\left[\frac{R+1}{R} \right] r = \alpha k^{\alpha-1} n^{1-\alpha} + \frac{r^{STOCK}}{R}$$

$$r = \left(\frac{R}{R+1} \right) \alpha k^{\alpha-1} n^{1-\alpha} + \frac{r^{STOCK}}{R+1}$$

Solve for r (return on "riskless" physical assets)

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FINANCING CONSTRAINT AND CAPITAL DEMAND


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$$r = \left(\frac{R}{R+1} \right) \alpha k^{\alpha-1} n^{1-\alpha} + \frac{r^{STOCK}}{R+1}$$

↓ Because exponent ($\alpha - 1$) is a negative number, can move to denominator

$$r = \left(\frac{R}{R+1} \right) \alpha \left(\frac{n_t}{k_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} + \frac{r^{STOCK}}{R+1}$$

CHAPTER 6: NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN r AND k



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FINANCING CONSTRAINT AND CAPITAL DEMAND


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$$r = \left(\frac{R}{R+1} \right) \alpha \left(\frac{n_t}{k_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} + \frac{r^{STOCK}}{R+1}$$

Rise (fall) in return on stock leads to shift out (in) of capital demand function



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
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FINANCING CONSTRAINT AND CAPITAL DEMAND

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- **IMPORTANT:** changes in financial market returns shift capital demand (and hence investment demand – recall $inv_t = k_{t+1} - k_t$)

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
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FINANCING CONSTRAINT AND CAPITAL DEMAND

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- **Basis for the financial accelerator effect**
- **Basis for understanding the role of financial oversight**

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FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR FRAMEWORK

Four Building Blocks of the Financial Accelerator Framework

1. Firm Profit Function

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1) a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2) a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 k_3}{1+i} - \frac{S_2 a_2}{1+i}$$

= 0 = 0

2. Financing Constraint

$$P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) = S_1 \cdot a_1$$

3. Government Regulation of Financial Relationships (imposition of R on financing constraint)

$$P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) = R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1$$

4. Relationship between firm profits and dividends

NOW

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DIVIDENDS AND PROFITS

- **Dividend: payment made by a corporation to its shareholders; the portion of corporate profits paid out to stockholders (Wikipedia definition)**
- **Corporate dividend policies differ widely across industries and companies**
 - Some companies retain most of their profits (to re-invest in ongoing projects)
 - Some industries' dividend policies subject to government regulation
 - Recently: financial companies receiving government support had dividend payments limited to \$0.01 per share
- **Recent average: ≈35 percent of profits disbursed as dividends**
 - Based on recent data collected by U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis for corporations listed on S&P 500

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DIVIDENDS AND PROFITS

- ❑ **Dividend:** payment made by a corporation to its shareholders; the portion of corporate profits paid out to stockholders (Wikipedia definition)
- ❑ **Corporate dividend policies differ widely across industries and companies**
 - ❑ Some companies retain most of their profits (to re-invest in ongoing projects)
 - ❑ Some industries' dividend policies subject to government regulation
 - ❑ Recently: financial companies receiving government support had dividend payments limited to \$0.01 per share
- ❑ **Recent average:** ≈ 35 percent of profits disbursed as dividends
 - ❑ Based on recent data collected by U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis for corporations listed on S&P 500
- ❑ **Simplifying assumption for our analytical framework**
 - ❑ All (100 percent) firm profits distributed as dividends
 - ❑ In period t , $D_t = \text{nominal profits}_t$
- ❑ **Building Block 4: Relationship between firm profits and dividends**

$$D_t = P_t \cdot \text{profit}_t \quad \leftarrow \text{REAL profits of firm in period } t$$

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FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR FRAMEWORK

- ❑ **Four Building Blocks of the Financial Accelerator Framework**

1. Firm Profit Function

$$P_1 f(k_1, n_1) + P_1 k_1 + (S_1 + D_1) a_0 - P_1 w_1 n_1 - P_1 k_2 - S_1 a_1 + \frac{P_2 f(k_2, n_2)}{1+i} + \frac{P_2 k_2}{1+i} + \frac{(S_2 + D_2) a_1}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 w_2 n_2}{1+i} - \frac{P_2 k_3}{1+i} - \frac{S_2 a_2}{1+i}$$

$\xrightarrow{=0}$ $\xrightarrow{=0}$

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
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FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR IN ACTION

- Suppose economy is in a "steady-state" in which $r = r^{STOCK}...$




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FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR IN ACTION

- Suppose economy is in a "steady-state" in which $r = r^{STOCK}...$
- ...then a **shock** causes r^{STOCK} to decline
 - i.e., broad range of financial asset returns suddenly fall...
 - ...perhaps because of problems stemming from one or a few classes of financial assets (i.e., mortgage-backed bonds)




- **Equilibrium quantity of (physical) investment falls**
 - Investment $\approx 15\%$ of GDP

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FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR IN ACTION

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
- Equilibrium quantity of (physical) investment **falls**
 - Investment $\approx 15\%$ of GDP
- Firm profits **fall** (i.e., investment no longer at profit-maximizing choice)
 - \rightarrow Dividends **fall** (Building Block 4: dividends = profits)
 - $\rightarrow r^{STOCK}$ falls even further! (because D a component of r^{STOCK})

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FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR IN ACTION

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
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 - \rightarrow Dividends **fall further** (Building Block 4: dividends = profits)
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FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR IN ACTION


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
FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR



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
FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR



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FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR



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POLICY AND REGULATORY RESPONSES

- ❑ Entire accelerator mechanism due to financing constraint

$$P_1 \cdot (k_2 - k_1) = R \cdot S_1 \cdot a_1$$

- ❑ Lagrange multiplier related to asset returns and government regulation by

$$\lambda = \left[\frac{r - r^{STOCK}}{1 + r} \right] \cdot \frac{1}{R}$$

- ❑ If r^{STOCK} falls below r (which causes accelerator mechanism to begin)

- ❑ λ increases

- ❑ Optimal regulatory response:

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- ❑ If r^{STOCK} falls below r (which causes accelerator mechanism to begin)

- ❑ λ increases

- ❑ Optimal regulatory response: raise R , which would cause λ to decline!

- ❑ If designed properly, a rise in R can perfectly offset the fall in r^{STOCK} , thus choking off the damaging effects of the accelerator

- ❑ Interpretation of rise in R

- ❑ For a given market value of financial assets, $S_1 a_1$, a higher R allows firms to borrow more from private lenders, in turn allowing them to purchase more (physical) capital

- ❑ One interpretation: government "guarantees" private loans

- ❑ Allows firms to produce more for the same level of financial resources

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POLICY AND REGULATORY RESPONSES

- ❑ Entire accelerator mechanism due to financing constraint

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- ❑ Interpretation of rise in R
 - ❑ For a given market value of financial assets, $S_1 a_1$, a higher R allows firms to borrow more in order to purchase more (physical) capital
 - ❑ Allows firms to produce more for the same exact financial resources
- ❑ Changes in R can be time-consuming to implement
 - ❑ Simultaneously controlled by Federal Reserve, Treasury, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Comptroller of the Currency, and several other regulatory agencies – huge coordination delays!

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POLICY AND REGULATORY RESPONSES

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 - ❑ Allows firms to produce more for the same exact financial resources
- ❑ Changes in R can be time-consuming to implement
 - ❑ Simultaneously controlled by Federal Reserve, Treasury, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Comptroller of the Currency, and several other regulatory agencies – huge coordination delays!
- ❑ Another "policy action" that has the same effect as raising R
 - ❑ Design policies to raise financial asset prices (i.e., S_1) directly!
 - ❑ Exactly the intention of U.S. Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
 - ❑ Direct purchases by Treasury of a wide variety of financial assets
 - ❑ The increased demand for these assets would lift their price
 - ❑ Exactly the intention of Federal Reserve's programs to buy a wide variety of financial assets – increased demand would lift prices

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REAL INTEREST RATE

- ❑ r a key variable for macroeconomic analysis
- ❑ Chapter 4: r measures the price of period-1 consumption in terms of period-2 consumption
- ❑ Chapter 8: r reflects degree of impatience
- ❑ r often reflects rate of consumption growth between periods
- ❑ Chapter 6: r measures the price/return of physical assets (i.e., machines and equipment) of firms
 - ❑ "Riskless" assets

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 - ❑ "Riskless" assets
- ❑ Now: r also measures price/return of risky assets (i.e., stock) in "steady state"
 - ❑ If $r = r^{STOCK}$, financing issues don't affect (very much) macroeconomic outcomes
 - ❑ If r and r^{STOCK} deviate significantly
 - ❑ Financial conditions of firms matter for investment/output
 - ❑ And can matter very importantly!

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 - ❑ •Riskless• assets
- ❑ Now: r also measures price/return of risky assets (i.e., stock) in "steady state"
- ❑ Can also think of λ itself as a type of real interest rate – an interest SPREAD
 - ❑ The price of bringing funds from "outside sources" (i.e., lenders) "inside" the firm (i.e., the borrower) to finance operations
 - ❑ If $r = r^{STOCK}$, this price equals zero
 - ❑ Cost of "external funding sources" vs. "internal funding sources" due to info. asymmetry