Department of Applied Economics Johns Hopkins University

Economics 602
Macroeconomic Theory and Policy
Problem Set 2 Suggested Solutions
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Spring 2012

1. **Interaction of Consumption Tax and Wage Tax.** A basic idea of President Bush's economic advisers throughout his administration was to try to move the U.S. further away from a system of investment taxes (which we will discuss later in the course) and more towards a system of consumption taxes**.** A nationwide consumption tax would essentially be a national sales tax. Here, you will modify our basic consumption-leisure model to include both a proportional wage tax (which we will now denote by t_n, where, as before, $0 \leq t_n < 1$) as well as a proportional consumption tax (which we will denote by t_c, where $0 \leq t_c < 1$). A proportional consumption tax means that for every dollar on the price tags of items the consumer buys, the consumer must pay $(1+t_c)$ dollars. Throughout the following, suppose that economic policy has no effect on wages or prices (that is, the nominal wage W and the price of consumption P are constant throughout).

    a. Construct the budget constraint in this modified version of the consumption-leisure model. Briefly explain economically how this budget constraint differs from that in the standard consumption-leisure model we have studied in class.

Solution: The representative agent's net income from working is now given by $Y = (1-t_n) \cdot W \cdot n$, where t_n is the labor tax rate and the other notation is the same as in Chapter 2. He spends all of this income on consumption, which now costs $P \cdot (1+t_c)$ dollars per unit (inclusive of the consumption tax). Using the fact that $n = 168 - l$ in the weekly model, equating the representative agent's labor income with his expenditures on consumption gives us

$$P \cdot (1+t_c) \cdot c = (1-t_n) \cdot W \cdot (168 - l).$$

If we multiply out the right-hand-side of this expression and then move the term involving the labor tax rate to the left-hand-side we obtain

$$P \cdot (1+t_c) \cdot c + (1-t_n) \cdot W \cdot l = 168 \cdot (1-t_n) \cdot W.$$

Then, solving this last expression for c, we arrive at

$$c = \frac{168 \cdot (1-t_n) \cdot W}{(1+t_c) \cdot P} - \frac{(1-t_n) \cdot W}{(1+t_c) \cdot P} l.$$

This last expression can now readily be graphed with consumption on the vertical axis and leisure on the horizontal axis. As in the standard model, the horizontal intercept is $l = 168$. However, the slope is now

$$-\frac{(1-t_n) \cdot W}{(1+t_c) \cdot P}.$$

Clearly, however, if we set the consumption tax rate to zero, we recover the budget constraint in our standard consumption-leisure model – indeed, the model we studied in Chapter 2 is simply a special case of the model here. The reason the budget constraint differs here from the standard model is simple: the consumption tax is yet another tax for the consumer to take account of when making his choices about consumption and leisure. No matter the model under consideration, the budget constraint always describes all the relevant tradeoffs between two alternative use of resources, and the relevant tradeoffs involve all taxes.

b. Suppose currently the federal wage tax rate is 20 percent ($t_n = 0.20$) while the federal consumption tax rate is 0 percent ($t_c = 0$), and that the Bush economic team is considering proposing lowering the wage tax rate to 15 percent. However, they wish to leave the representative agent's optimal choice of consumption and leisure unaffected. Can they simultaneously increase the consumption tax rate from its current zero percent to achieve this goal? If so, compute the new associated consumption tax rate, and explain the economic intuition. If not, explain mathematically as well as economically why not.

Solution: From the analysis in part a above, we see that the slope of the budget constraint depends on the **relative tax** $(1-t_n)/(1+t_c)$ (in addition to the term W/P, but you are told to assume that W and P remain constant). Under the current tax policy of a 20 percent wage tax and zero consumption tax, the relative tax is $(1-0.20)/(1+0) = 0.80$. So the slope of the representative agent's budget constraint is currently $-0.80W/P$, on which he makes some optimal choice of consumption and leisure.

Now the government wants to lower the labor tax rate to $t_n = 0.15$ but wants to leave the representative agent's optimal choice of consumption and leisure unchanged. This means that whatever the government does, it must make sure that the slope of his budget constraint does not change – which means that the relative tax must remain 0.80. We can then solve for the new consumption tax rate that yields this relative tax: $(1-0.15)/(1+t_c) = 0.80$ means that the government must set a consumption tax rate of $t_c = 0.0625$. The economic reasoning is that the relative tax has two free variables in it, the labor tax and the consumption tax. There are an infinite number of combinations that yield any particular value of the relative tax. Think of the following simple example: if you have two numbers x and y, and you are asked to come up with a combination of the two variables such that $x/y = 0.80$, there are obviously an infinite number of combinations that work.

c. A **tax policy** is defined as a particular combination of tax rates. For example a labor tax rate of 20 percent combined with a consumption tax rate of zero percent is one particular tax policy. A labor tax rate of five percent combined with a consumption tax rate of 10 percent is a different tax policy. Based on what you found in parts a and b above, address the following statement: a government can use many different tax policies to induce the same level of consumption by individuals.

Solution: The statement is true, and it follows from the discussion given in part b above. If the government believes that W and P are unaffected by its tax policies (which is not true – we will address this issue soon), then it has two tax rates it can alter to achieve its goals, but it is only the relative tax that affects the representative agent's budget constraint.

d. Consider again the Bush proposal to lower the wage tax rate from 20 percent to 15 percent. This time, however, policy discussion is focused on trying to boost overall consumption. Is it possible for this goal to be achieved if the consumption tax rate is raised from its current zero percent?

Solution: We saw in the standard consumption-leisure model that as the budget line became steeper, consumption increases. This is still true in this version of the consumption-leisure model. The current tax policy has $t_n = 0.20$ and $t_c = 0$ so that the relative tax is $(1-0.20)/(1+0) = 0.80$. Any new tax policy which features a larger value of $(1-t_n)/(1+t_c)$ (and hence a steeper budget constraint) will thus achieve the desired goal of higher overall consumption. With a labor tax rate of $t_n = 0.15$, we thus need

$$\frac{(1-0.15)}{(1+t_c)} > 0.80.$$

Solving this inequality for t_c, we have that

$$t_c < 0.0625$$

achieves the desired goal. So **any** tax policy with $t_n = 0.15$ and $t_c < 0.0625$ achieves the desired policy role. So the conclusion is: yes, the consumption tax rate can be raised and the desired goal still be achieved.

e. Using a Lagrangian, derive the consumer's consumption-leisure optimality condition (for an arbitrary utility function) as a function of the real wage and the consumption and labor tax rates.

Solution: The Lagrangian is

$$L(c,l,\lambda)=u(c,l)+\lambda\left[(1-t_n)W(168-l)-P(1+t_c)c\right]$$

The FOCs with respect to consumption and leisure are (we'll ignore the one with respect to the multiplier because in order to generate the consumption-leisure optimality condition, we actually don't need it):

$$u_c(c,l)-\lambda P(1+t_c)=0$$
$$u_l(c,l)-\lambda W(1-t_n)=0$$

To generate the consumption-leisure optimality condition, we must combine these two expressions by eliminating λ between them. Doing so, and expressing one side of the resulting expressing as the MRS between consumption and leisure, we have

$$\frac{u_l(c,l)}{u_c(c,l)}=\frac{(1-t_n)W}{(1+t_c)P}.$$

The left-hand side is the representative consumer's MRS between consumption and leisure, and the right-hand-side is the real wage rate (W/P) adjusted by **both** the labor and consumption taxes.

2. **Non-Backward-Bending Labor Supply Curve.** Consider an economy populated by 100 individuals who have identical preferences over consumption and leisure. In this economy, the aggregate labor supply curve is upward-sloping. For simplicity, suppose throughout this question that the labor tax rate is zero.

   a. For such a labor supply curve, how does the substitution effect compare with the income effect?

   Solution: The upward-sloping region of any individual's labor supply curve arises because the substitution effect of a higher real wage dominates the income effect of a higher real wage. (See the discussion in Chapter 2.) Thus, if the individual's labor supply curve is always upward-sloping, then it must be that for this individual the substitution effect always outweighs the income effect. With 100 identical individuals in the economy, the aggregate labor supply curve is simple the sum of each individual's labor supply curve, and thus inherits the properties of the individuals' labor supply curves.

   Extended Note: the labor supply curve cannot literally be **always** upward-sloping. The upper-limit on the labor axis is of course (for the weekly model) 168 hours. Once that upper limit is reached (i.e., a person is doing nothing but working), any further rise in the real wage cannot increase hours worked – hence the labor supply curve becomes vertical. But this latter effect should probably strike you as uninteresting because then the individual does not enjoy any leisure at all. Indeed, if we have a "usual" indifference map over consumption and leisure, we will never have that an indifference curve is tangent to the budget line on either axis, a necessary implication of an optimal choice that has zero leisure (try drawing this to convince yourself).

b. Using indifference curves and budget constraints, show how such a labor supply curve arises.

Solution: We must have that any rise in the real wage leads to a higher optimal choice of consumption **and** a lower optimal choice of leisure (with of course a natural zero lower bound on leisure – see the Extended Note above), irrespective of the current real wage.



In the above diagram, as the real wage rises from $(W/P)_1$ to $(W/P)_2$ to $(W/P)_3$ to $(W/P)_4$, the optimal choice moves from point A to B to C to D, respectively. Clearly, as the real wage rises, the quantity of leisure demanded (and hence the quantity of labor supplied) rises, consistent with a labor-supply curve that does not bend backwards.

3. **A Backward-Bending Aggregate Labor Supply Curve?** Despite our use of the backward-bending labor supply curve as arising from the representative agent's preferences, there is controversy in macroeconomics about whether this is a good representation. Specifically, even though a backward-bending labor supply curve may be a good description of a given individual's decisions, it does **not** immediately

follow that the representative agent's preferences should also feature a backward-bending labor supply curve. In this exercise you will uncover for yourself this problem. For simplicity, assume that the labor tax rate is $t = 0$ throughout all that follows.

a. Suppose the economy is made up of five individuals, person A, person B, person C, person D, and person E, each of whom has the labor supply schedule given below. Using the indicated wage rates, graph each individual's labor supply curve **as well as** the aggregate labor supply curve.

Solution: In the table below, the aggregate (total) number of hours worked by all persons in the economy at each wage rate is now shown (this was not given to you).

Nominal Wage, W	Person A	Person B	Person C	Person D	Person E	Aggregate
$10	20 hours	0 hours	0 hours	0 hours	0 hours	20 hours
$15	25	15	0	0	0	40
$20	30	22	8	0	0	60
$25	33	27	15	5	0	80
$30	35	30	20	15	0	100
$35	37	32	25	20	6	120
$40	36	31	27	25	21	140
$45	35	30	26	28	30	149
$50	33	29	24	25	29	140

The aggregate labor supply curve simply plots the values in the last column in the table above against the wage rate (with, recall, the labor tax rate held constant at $t_n = 0$ throughout for simplicity), as shown below. Clearly, most of the aggregate labor supply curve is upward-sloping, with only the very top portion backward-bending. For brevity, the individuals' labor supply curves are omitted – they are of course simply each individual's hours worked plotted against the wage, and it should be clear even from the table that each individual in the economy has a backward-bending labor supply curve.



Now suppose that in this economy, the "usual" range of the nominal wage is between \$10 and \$45.

b. Restricting attention to this range, is the aggregate labor supply curve backward-bending?

Solution: If the usual range of the nominal wage is \$10-\$45 in the economy, then clearly no (see the Figure above), the aggregate labor supply is **not** backward-bending.

c. At a theoretical level, if we want to use the representative-agent paradigm and restrict attention to this usual range of the wage, does a backward-bending labor supply curve make sense?

Solution: The point of the representative-agent framework is to represent theoretically the "average" person in the economy in all aspects of his economic life (in so far as such theoretical modeling is possible…), including of course his labor supply decisions. The "average" person in the economy does not earn the highest wages in the economy.

d. Explain qualitatively the relationship you find between the individuals' labor supply curves and the aggregate labor supply curve over the range \$10 – \$45. Especially address the "backward-bending" nature of the curves.

Solution: Over the range \$10 - \$45, the labor supply curves of person A, person B, and person C are backward-bending, while the labor supply curves of person D and person E are not (notice that the labor supply curves of person D and person E do not bend backwards until the range \$45 - \$50). The aggregate labor supply curve is always upward-sloping in this range of the wage. The fundamental issue here is that people are different from each other in such a way that the average person, over the range \$10-\$45, "looks like" only 2 of the 5 people in this economy (person D and person E). We could easily construct another example in which the representative agent's labor supply "looked like" well less than 40% of the population over some "usual" range of income. This illustrates that microeconomic phenomena (in this case the backward-bending labor supply curve) when summed together do not necessarily give qualitatively the same phenomena at the macroeconomic level – a cautionary note in using the representative-agent approach to macroeconomics.

4. **Consumption, Labor, and Unemployment: Fiscal Policy Choices in a Search Framework.** The 2010 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Peter Diamond, Dale Mortensen, and Christopher Pissarides for their development (during the 1970s and 1980s) of search theory. Search theory is a framework especially suited for studying labor market issues. The search framework builds on, but is richer than, the basic theory of supply and demand. Search theory can be applied to both the supply side of the labor market (building on the analysis of Chapter 2) as well as the demand side of the labor market (building on the analysis of Chapter 6, which we will study later in the course). In what follows, you will study the application of search theory to the supply side of the labor market.

There are three basic ideas underlying search theory. First, search theory incorporates into basic supply-and-demand analysis the fact that when an individual wants to work (i.e., "supplies labor"), there is a chance that employment may not be found. That is, an individual "searching" for a job has a **probability less than one** that a suitable "match" will be found.

Second, as a direct consequence of the probabilistic nature of successfully finding a job, there is a **probability larger than zero** that an individual might end up "unemployed" – that is, having searched for work but not found anything. In this case, he/she receives "unemployment benefits" from the government.

Third, search theory makes explicit the **costs associated with search activity.** As is realistic, when an individual wants a job, he/she does not simply "go to the market" as in basic supply-and-demand analysis. Rather, the individual must expend resources **searching** for a job (think of these costs as due to the time spent looking at recruiting advertisements through various web and networking channels, at career fairs, going through the interviewing process, etc.).

We will incorporate these three ideas into the **one-period consumption-labor framework** of Chapter 2, thereby enriching the range of predictions that it can generate and policy advice it may be able to offer. To do so, first introduce some notation:

p^{FIND}: the **probability** that an individual searching for a job finds suitable employment. By the definitions of probabilities, $p^{FIND} \in [0,1]$ (that is, the probability is a number between zero and one). **Hence, the probability of not finding a job is 1-p^{FIND}.** (**Note:** *p* does **not** denote a "price.")

s: the "search cost," measured in real units (that is, in units of consumption goods) that an individual incurs for **each hour that he/she would like to work.** For example, if the individual desires n =10 hours of work during the week, the total search cost is 10s; if the individual desires n = 20 hours of work during the week, the total search cost is 20s; and so on. The way to interpret this is that it is more costly (in a search sense) to find a job the closer it is to a "full time" job because one has to send out more applications, go through more interviews, etc. The search cost is $s \geq 0$.

b: the "unemployment benefit," measured in real units (that is, in units of consumption goods) that an individual receives for **each hour that he/she does not work**. For example, if the individual does **not** work (which is tantamount to "taking leisure") for l = 50 hours during the week, he/she receives a total of $50b$ in unemployment benefits; if the individual does **not** work for l = 100 hours during the week, he/she receives a total of $100b$ in unemployment benefits; and so on. **In principle, the unemployment benefit is $b \geq 0$. However, we will focus on the case in which b = 0 exactly, even though the term b does appear in the expressions below.**

In quantitative and policy applications that use this framework, a commonly-used utility function is

$$u(c,l) = \ln c - \frac{\theta}{1+1/\psi}(168-l)^{1+1/\psi},$$

in which ψ and θ (the Greek letters "psi" and "theta," respectively) are **constants** (even though we will not assign any numerical value to them) in the utility function. The representative individual has no control over either ψ or θ, and both $\psi > 0$ and $\theta > 0$. You are to use this utility function throughout the analysis.

The budget constraint, expressed in **real units** (that is, in units of consumption goods), is

$$c + sn = p^{FIND}(1-t)wn + \left(1 - p^{FIND}\right)bl,$$

in which, w denotes the **real wage** and t the labor income tax rate. The right hand side (the income side) of the budget constraint is expressed in "**expected value form"** because of the fact that two **mutually exclusive** things can occur: a job is found (which occurs with probability p^{FIND}), in which case income is after-tax wage earnings; or a job is not found (which occurs with probability 1- p^{FIND}), in which case income is the total unemployment benefits received from the government.[1] **AGAIN, note that we will consider only the case of b = 0 exactly, even though it appears in the expression above.**

To complete the description of the (representative) individual's utility maximization problem:

- Just as in Chapter 2, adopt a weekly view, so that n + l = 168, with n denoting the number of hours that an individual works, and l the number of hours spent not working.
- The variables **taken as given** by the individual are real wages, the probability of finding a suitable job, the search cost per hour of (desired) work, and the

[1] The "expected value" form of the budget constraint arises from application of the probability and statistics concept of "expectations" of uncertain events (here, "getting a job" is an uncertain event). For our purposes, you can simply take the budget constraint as written as given, with no need to connect it to the underlying probability and statistics framework.

unemployment benefit per hour of non-work. That is, the individual takes $\left(w, p^{FIND}, t, s, b\right)$ as given when solving his/her utility maximization problem.

(OVER)

Problem 4 continued

a. Using the setup of the problem, algebraically re-arrange the given budget constraint so that, in your final expression, the variables c and l each appear **only** on the left hand side, and the variable n does **not** directly appear at all. Clearly present the steps and logic of your work. **(Note:** the correct expression for the budget constraint is critical for all of the analysis that follows, so you should make sure that your work here is absolutely correct! If the budget constraint here is incorrect, we will **not** necessarily "carry through the error" all the way through the remainder of your analysis when reviewing solutions.)

Solution: Start by substituting the time constraint $n = 168 - l$ into the given budget constraint, which gives

$$c + s(168-l) = p^{FIND}(1-t)w(168-l) + \left(1-p^{FIND}\right)bl .$$

The next goal is to group together all the terms involving l. Expanding out terms on both the left-hand and right-hand sides gives

$$c + 168s - sl = 168p^{FIND}(1-t)w - p^{FIND}(1-t)wl + \left(1-p^{FIND}\right)bl .$$

Then, grouping terms involving l on the right-hand side together gives

$$c + 168s - sl = 168p^{FIND}(1-t)w - \left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w - \left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b\right]l .$$

After moving the term in square brackets over to the left-hand side, and grouping it together with the $-sl$ term on the left-hand side, we have

$$c + \left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w - \left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b - s\right]l + 168s = 168p^{FIND}(1-t)w .$$

One final step, moving the term $168s$ from the left-hand side to the right-hand side, gives the budget constraint in the requested form:

$$c + \left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w - \left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b - s\right]l = 168\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w - s\right]$$

b. Based on the budget constraint in part a, construct the Lagrangian for the consumer's utility maximization problem. Clearly present the steps and logic of your analysis.

Solution: As per the construction of any Lagrangian, the first component is the objective function to be optimized, and the second component is the constraint on the optimization (written appropriately and appended with the Lagrange multiplier):

$$u(c,l)+\lambda\left\{168\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-s\right]-c-\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-\left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b-s\right]l\right\},$$

or, with the given utility function inserted,

$$\ln c-\frac{\theta}{1+1/\psi}(168-l)^{1+1/\psi}+\lambda\left\{168\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-s\right]-c-\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-\left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b-s\right]l\right\}$$

(Either representation is fine, but the latter is more directly relevant for the subsequent analysis.)

c. Based on the Lagrangian constructed in part b, compute the first-order conditions with respect to both c and l. **(Note: your analysis is to be based on the utility function given above).** Clearly present the steps and logic of your analysis.

Solution: The first-order conditions with respect to c and l, based on the Lagrangian above and the given utility function, are, respectively,

$$\frac{1}{c}-\lambda=0$$

and

$$\theta(168-l)^{1/\psi}-\lambda\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-\left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b-s\right]=0.$$

(As always, these first-order conditions are simply the respective partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect c and l, each set equal to zero. By this point, even though the analysis in this problem is more involved than ones we have studied in class, setting up Lagrangians and computing first-order conditions should be conceptually completely clear. If it is not, there is probably cause for concern.)

d. Based on the two first-order conditions computed in part c, construct the consumption-leisure optimality condition. The final expression must read

$$\frac{u_l(c,l)}{u_c(c,l)}=\ldots$$

in which the right hand side of the expression is for you to determine. **Your final expression may NOT include any Lagrange multipliers in it.** You should present very clearly the algebraic steps involved in constructing this expression.

Solution: The FOC on c obtained above immediately tells us that $\lambda = 1/c$ at the optimal choice. Inserting this expression for λ into the FOC on l obtained above gives

$$\theta(168-l)^{1/\psi} = \frac{1}{c}\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-\left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b-s\right].$$

Dividing both sides by $1/c$ gives

$$\frac{\theta(168-l)^{1/\psi}}{1/c} = p^{FIND}(1-t)w-\left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b-s,$$

which is in the final requested form because the numerator on the left-hand side is the marginal utility of leisure, and the denominate on the left-hand side is the marginal utility of consumption. This expression is thus the consumption-leisure optimality condition for the search framework.

e. **Qualitatively** sketch the consumption-leisure optimality condition obtained in part d in a graph with c on the vertical axis and l on the horizontal axis. **Clearly label the slope of the budget line in the sketch.**

Solution: In the final expression obtained in part d, the right hand side is the (absolute value of the) slope of the budget line – that is, the slope of the budget line is

$$-\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-\left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b-s\right],$$

which, notice, is a generalization of the slope of the budget constraint of the consumption-labor framework of Chapter 2. In particular, if $p^{FIND} = 1$, $b = 0$, and $s = 0$, then we have the slope is $-(1-t)w$, just as in Chapter 2.

In Chapter 2, recall that the **horizontal** intercept of the budget line (that is, the intercept on the leisure axis) was 168. Here, the horizontal intercept is not 168. To determine what the horizontal intercept in this problem is, start from the budget constraint as expressed in, say, the final solution in part a. Suppose that $c = 0$ in the budget constraint; solving for l gives

$$\text{horizontal intercept} = \frac{168\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-s\right]}{\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-s-\left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b\right]}.$$

Note the following observation: if $b = 0$ (that is, temporarily substitute $b = 0$ into the above expression), then the horizontal intercept does simplify to 168 despite the presence of search frictions. But if $b > 0$, then the horizontal intercept does not equal 168.

If $b > 0$ and if $p^{FIND} < 1$, then it is clear that the term $(1-p^{FIND})b > 0$. Hence, the term $\left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-s\right] > \left[p^{FIND}(1-t)w-s-\left(1-p^{FIND}\right)b\right]$; that is, the numerator (excluding the multiple 168) of the previous expression is larger than the denominator of the previous expression. Hence, overall, the horizontal intercept is **larger than** 168. These observations are important for a full accounting in the subsequent analysis, though it makes the complete analysis cumbersome. Thus, it was fine if you based the analysis only on the slope of the budget line and the induced changes in the optimal choice, and this is how the rest of the analysis proceeds.

Due to the economic downturn and associated sluggishness in employment, the government has been considering (and engaging in) various forms of interventions in labor markets aimed at increasing the welfare (the utility) of individuals. Based on the sketch in part e, you are to analyze various types of labor market interventions with a focus on determining whether or not they would increase the welfare (the utility) of the representative individual. **(Note:** you are not required to draw new sketches in the subsequent analysis, but you may do so if it clarifies your work.)

f. Based on and referring to the sketch in part e, would a reduction in the labor income tax rate t increase utility, decrease utility, or leave utility unchanged? Or is it impossible to determine? **Clearly and briefly** describe the **economic interpretation** (that is, not simply a verbal re-statement of the mathematical or graphical analysis) for your conclusion.

Solution: Based on the analysis in part e, a reduction in t increases the absolute value of the slope – that is, the budget line becomes steeper. However, the budget line does not simply pivot around the horizontal intercept in this case because, as the analysis in part e showed, the horizontal intercept is not fixed in this case.

However, focusing only on changes induced by the steepening of the budget line, as the conclusion in part e permitted, the new optimal choice (on the new steeper budget line) clearly has higher utility (because it lies on a higher indifference curve). The economic interpretation is that if individuals can take home a larger portion of their labor income as after-tax pay, they will be better off.

g. Based on and referring to the sketch in part e, would an increase in the unemployment benefit b increase utility, decrease utility, or leave utility unchanged? Or is it impossible to determine? **Clearly and briefly** describe the **economic interpretation** (that is, not simply a verbal re-statement of the mathematical or graphical analysis) for your conclusion.

Solution: Based on the analysis in part e, an increase in b reduces the absolute value of the slope – that is, the budget line becomes flatter. However, the budget line does not pivot around the horizontal intercept in this case because, as the analysis in part e showed, the horizontal intercept is not fixed in this case.

However, focusing only on changes induced by the flattening of the budget line, as the conclusion in part e permitted, the new optimal choice (on the new flatter budget line) clearly has lower utility (because it lies on a lower indifference curve). The economic interpretation is that if individuals can receive a larger quantity of payments (unemployment benefits) by not working, it reduces their incentive to search for or accept jobs in the first place. This ultimately leads to lower utility, however, to the extent that market (expected) wages are nonetheless higher than unemployment benefits.

h. Based on and referring to the sketch in part e, would policies aimed at reducing the search cost s incurred by individuals increase utility, decrease utility, or leave utility unchanged? Or is it impossible to determine? **Clearly and briefly** describe the **economic interpretation** (that is, not simply a verbal re-statement of the mathematical or graphical analysis) for your conclusion.

Solution: Based on the analysis in part e, a reduction in s increases the absolute value of the slope – that is, the budget line becomes steeper. However, the budget line does not pivot around the horizontal intercept in this case because, as the analysis in part e showed, the horizontal intercept is not fixed in this case.

However, focusing only on changes induced by the steepening of the budget line, as the conclusion in part e permitted, the new optimal choice (on the new steeper budget line) clearly has higher utility (because it lies on a higher indifference curve). The economic interpretation is that if it is less costly to search for a job, individuals will be willing to search harder for jobs, which means they are more likely to actually end up with a job, even if p^{FIND} is constant. This ultimately increases individuals' welfare.

i. Based on and referring to the sketch in part e, would policies aimed at increasing the probability p^{FIND} that individuals can find suitable jobs increase utility, decrease utility, or leave utility unchanged? Or is it impossible to determine? **Clearly and briefly** describe the **economic interpretation** (that is, not simply a verbal re-statement of the mathematical or graphical analysis) for your conclusion.

Solution: Based on the analysis in part e, an increase in p^{FIND} increases the absolute value of the slope – that is, the budget line becomes steeper. However, the budget line does not pivot around the horizontal intercept in this case because, as the analysis in part e showed, the horizontal intercept is not fixed in this case.

However, focusing only on changes induced by the steepening of the budget line, as the conclusion in part e permitted, the new optimal choice (on the new steeper budget line) clearly has higher utility (because it lies on a higher indifference curve). The economic interpretation is that if it is more likely an individual will find a job, even holding constant how hard they look for a job, they will be better off.